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Bauman: Sperm Donation

NOTE
DISCOVERING DONORS:
LEGAL RIGHTS TO ACCESS
INFORMATION ABOUT
ANONYMOUS SPERM DONORS
GIVEN TO CHILDREN OF
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IN
JOHNSON v. SUPERIOR COURT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 18, 2000, the Second District of the California
Court of Appeals, Division Two, forever altered the artificial
insemination industry.! On the surface, Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et al., 2 balanced the rights
of two parties to an artificial insemination procedure, those of
the donor and those of the child created. 3 However, a look beneath the surface of this decision yields a ruling that undermines the practice of protecting a sperm donor's anonymity, a
practice that has been at the heart of the artificial insemination industry for years. 4
The Johnson case is particularly important to the artificial insemination industry because of the prevalence of the
1 See Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et aI., 80 Cal. App.
4th 1050 (2000).
2 See id.
a See id. at 1056.
• See Timothy J. McNulty, Dilemma is Born: Donor's Rights vs. Children's, Cm·
CAGO TRmUNE, August 10, 1987, at 1.
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use of anonymous sperm donors in combating infertility. Approximately ten percent of married couples have difficulty
conceiving children. 5 For many of these couples, expensive and
emotionally draining fertility procedures become part of the
regular routine of attempting to achieve the dream of
parenthood. 6 Considering the extensive process, couples who
participate in these procedures have high hopes that the children born will be healthy.
Typically, a heterosexual couple that chooses artificial insemination by an anonymous donor does so because the man
suffers from a low sperm count, no sperm count, or has a
known genetic disease or defect that he does not wish to pass
on to his child. 7 For a couple dealing with such issues, an
anonymous sperm donor chosen from a sperm bank seems to
be an ideal alternative. 8 For example, the couple can choose a
sperm donor whose features closely resemble that of the husband, and participate in the pregnancy and the birth of the
child together. 9 Furthermore, once the child is born, the husband becomes, by law, the natural father, and his name goes
on the birth certificate. lO The couple can then raise the child
as mother and father, left with the choice of whether to tell
their child of his or her true biological origin. 11
Due to the stigma that attaches to infertility, artificial in5 See. Donor Insemination Website (visited June 24, 2000) <http://www.ivf.coml
donorins.html>.
6 See Darryl E. Owens, Pain of Infertility, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 19,
1999 [Reprinted at Promise to Deliver Website (visited June 29, 2000)
<www.promisetodeliver.comlarticle_poi.htm».In1996. it was reported by the Centers
for Disease Control that 20,600 children were conceived as the result of assisted reproduction techniques such as in vitro fertilization. This was a success rate of about
22 percent for women that attempted such methods. Women who undergo these procedures are often so desperate to have a child that the expense of such treatments as
in vitro fertilization, which can cost up to $15,000, is well worth the joy of having
their own children. See id.
7 See Artificial Insemination by Donor (A.I.D.) Website (visited June 24, 2000)
<http://www.indiaparenting.comlfertility/datalfert08_03.shtml>.
8 See Hollace S.W. Swanson, Donor Anonymity: Is it Still Necessary?, 27 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 151, 153, 154 (1993).
9 See Artificial Insemination by Donor (A.I.D.) Website, supra note 7.
10 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000).
11 See Sylvia Rubin, Family Secrets, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, January 15,
1995 at 1.
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semination is a highly sensitive subject.12· Anonymity of the
sperm donor is usually important to both the recipient couples
and the anonymous donors.13 Often, recipient couples intend
to raise their children without acknowledging that they conceived their children through artificial insemination. 14 Furthermore, anonymous donors wish to remain anonymous to
avoid future confrontation by a child created with his sperm
or that child's family.15 The artificial insemination process is
therefore rooted in secrecy and anonymity.16 For example, a
donor may choose whether his identity may be revealed by entering into privacy agreements with the sperm bank to which
he sells his sperm.17 Additionally, prior to artificial insemination, couples often sign agreements with sperm banks stating
that the donors will remain anonymous, and are also given
the option to maintain anonymity.1S
In the Johnson case, six-year-old Brittany, a child conceived through artificial insemination, was diagnosed with a
genetically-transmitted kidney disease originating from the
child's anonymous sperm donor.19 The case documents the parents' struggle to obtain personal medical information regarding the anonymous donor.2o It also illustrates the donor's
fight, with the full support of the sperm bank, to maintain his
anonymity at all costS. 21
This Note discusses the court's decision in Johnson v. Su12 See Kristin E. Koehler, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest? 5
ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH. 321, 335, 336 (1996).
13 See id. See also McNulty, supra note 4, at 1.
14 See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1. See also Susan Edelman, Anonymous Fathers;
Sperm Bank Procedures Suggest Need for Regulation, THE RECORD, August 7, 1988 at
AI.
15 See Frank H. Boehm, How He Met His Son; A Sperm Donor's Experience
Raises Questions that Must Be Answered by the Medical Community, THE TENNESSEAN, April 2, 1996 at A7.
16 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 354.
17 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 154. See also Rubin, supra note 11, at 1. Some
sperm banks give donors the option of making their identities available to the children created once the child reaches the age of 18. The California Sperm Bank, a
sperm bank that offers this to donors, states that about 40 percent of the donors take
this option. See id.
18 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 154.
19 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1055.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 1056.
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perior Court of Los Angeles County, et al., 22 in which it held
that children created through artificial insemination should
be allowed access to information about their anonymous
sperm donor fathers under limited circumstances. 23 This Note
will also explain the impact this decision will have on current
sperm bank practices. Part II explains the background of the
artificial insemination industry, as well as privacy rights discussed by the Johnson court.24 Part III will discuss the facts
of the case and its procedural history.25 Part IV explains the
court's analysis of this case and its decision. 26 Part V critiques
the court's analysis and discusses the possible effect the decision may have on the artificial insemination industry. 27
II.

BACKGROUND

As the practice of artificial insemination grows in popularity, questions about the industry's procedures and requirements for anonymity have increased. 28 Few laws regulate the
artificial insemination industry, causing the rights of parties
in artificial insemination processes to remain unclear. 29
A. THE SPERM BANK INDUSTRY

Approximately 30,000 children per year are born as a result of the artificial insemination of sperm from an anonymous donor.3o While the procedure has been practiced for
more than one hundred years, it has, in recent decades, become an increasingly popular means of artificial reproduction. 31 Artificial insemination by an anonymous donor is a
process by which a woman, during ovulation, is inseminated
with the sperm of an unknown male specifically selected by
See id. at 1050.
23 See id. at 1073.
24 See infra notes 28-77 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 78-127 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 128-207 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 208-238 and accompanying text.
26 See Sally Squires, Sperm Bank Boom Stirs Fear, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, February
17, 1993 at N9.
29 See id.
30 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 152.
31 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 322-323.
22
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the recipient. 32 This process has become so popular that, by
the early 1990s, the sperm bank industry generated earnings
of approximately $164 million per year. 33 Each individual
sperm bank may store the sperm of as many as 100,000 donors.34 In choosing a sperm donor, a woman may choose from
a variety of characteristics, from physical characteristics such
as race, ethnicity and eye color, as well as personality traits,
education and occupation. 35 Approximately 400 commercial
sperm banks in the United States facilitate this process. 36
Artificial insemination is less complicated and less expensive than alternatives such as adoption because the artificial
insemination procedure is relatively inexpensive and quickly
performed. 37 This process also allows a couple to avoid the extensive waiting periods for and shortages of adoptable babies
that prospective adoptive parents must endure. 3s Furthermore, with artificial insemination, the child is biologically the
child of the woman impregnated and legally that of her
husband. 39
Although artificial insemination is a relatively simple process, many complications and problems may arise, one of
which is the transfer of an unexpected genetic disease to the
child conceived. 40 To combat this problem, sperm banks that
sell donor sperm are expected to rigorously test to ensure that
the donor is physically healthy and lacking any genetic defects.41 This extensive screening is important to avoid genetic
32 See Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in the United States, 30 MICH. J.L. REF. 823, 825-826 (1997).
33 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 152.
34 See Squires, supra note 28, at N9.
35 See Jeff Stryker, Artificial Insemination Is More Widely Available-and More
Problematic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (From THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER), October
12, 1993 at 8C. See also Swanson, supra note 8, at 152.
36 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 826.
37 See Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, February 17, 1992, at 9.
as See Donor Insemination Website, supra note 5.
39 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000).
40 See Megan D. McIntyre, The Potential for Products Liability Actions when Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects,
98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 524 (1993).
41 See Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9. Under guidelines recommended by the American Fertility Society and the American Association of Tissue
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defects, a common reason why couples seek donor sperm.42
However, if an anonymous donor passes a genetic disease or
defect to a child conceived through artificial insemination, the
dilemma becomes whose rights take priority: the rights of the
donor to remain anonymous, or the rights of the parents of
the artificially conceived child to obtain medical information
about the unknown donor. 43

B.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

LAws

AND PRACTICES

1. The Uniform Parentage Act
In 1973, the Uniform Parentage Act remedied concerns
regarding the legitimacy of children born through artificial insemination. 44 The Act stated that when a husband and wife
conceive a child using sperm that is not that of the husband's,
and the husband consents in writing to the conception, the
child born of that conception becomes that of the husband. 45
In addition to clarifying the identity of the legal father, the
California Family Code also requires that the artificial insemination take place under the supervision of a physician and a
surgeon. 46 Although the statute requires documentation regarding an insemination remains confidential within the medical facility performing the procedure, such documentation, including an anonymous donor's identity, may be open to
inspection if a party demonstrates good cause to do soY

2. Sperm Bank Procedures
The sperm bank industry has a long-standing assertion
that the best interests of all involved are served if every party
Banks, potential donors must complete a full medical history, endure an extensive
physical examination and genetic testing. Their sperm must then be tested for sexually transmitted diseases. Only after potential donor passes all of these tests should
he be an acceptable donor. See id.
42 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 823.
43 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 329-330.
44 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Swanson, supra note 8, at
162.
45 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000).
46 See id.
47 See id.
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maintains complete and total anonymity.48 Although this assertion allegedly protects everyone, some critics believe that
the industry's true interest lies in protecting the donor.49 The
sperm bank industry strongly believes that any waiver in its
anonymity policies would drastically reduce the number of
those willing to donate sperm. 50 Although such a conclusion
has not been substantiated,51 donors often desire anonymity
because they do not want to be legally obligated to any children created by the artificial insemination of their sperm. 52
Once a man is accepted as a sperm donor, the sperm bank
views him as an investment, able to donate sperm as often as
three times a week, at an average cost to the sperm bank of
$50 per donation. 53 Currently, no legal restrictions limit the
number of times a sperm bank may use an individual donor's
sperm in artificial insemination, or the number of children
that may be conceived. 54
Despite the "good cause" exception found in Section 7613,
the general practice of many sperm banks is to destroy all
documentation regarding the artificial insemination procedures they perform. 55 This practice enables the sperm bank to
maintain the anonymity of the donor, as well as that of recipient couples. 56 This practice is supported by the belief of sperm
bank physicians that the donor screening process is so thorough that virtually no risk exists of transmitting any diseases
to the children conceived. 57
This belief was tested in the mid:1980s, in the midst of
the growing AIDS epidemic. 58 Although only a few cases have
documented women contracting AIDS from donor sperm,59 the
scare prompted leading artificial insemination organizations,
48
49

50

51
62

63
54
66
66
67
68

See
See
See
See
See

McNulty, supra note 4, at 1.
id.
Swanson, supra note 8, at 171.
id. at 153, 171-172.
Koehler, supra note 12, at 333.
see Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9.
See Edelman, supra note 14, at AI. See also Stryker, supra note 35, at 8C.
See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See Pre·1986 AIDS Tests are Urged, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, March 15, 1995,

at 6A
69

See id.
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such as the American Fertility Society and the American Association of Tissue Banks, to recommend ending the use of
fresh sperm in inseminations and instituting strict guidelines
for donor screening.60 However, these established guidelines
that were never made mandatory.61 As a 'result, all sperm
banks do not follow these guidelines. 62
In California, as in most of the country, relatively little
case law addresses artificial insemination. 63 The California
cases that do concern artificial insemination have focused on
issues such as paternity and visitation rights. 64 For example,
a California appellate court held that a woman may use an
anonymous donor to conceive a child without fear that the do- .
nor may establish paternity rights. 65 Conversely, she will
never be able to collect child support from the donor, since he
is not legally considered the natural father of the child. 66
60 See Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9. The
guidelines recommended by the American Fertility Society and the American Association of Tissue Banks would screen out 80 to 85 percent of possible donors, rejecting
them for such factors as age, sexual history and orientation, and drug use. See id.
61

See Squires, supra note 28, at 9.

62 See id. Cf Marlene Cimons, Fertility Doctor's Case Raises Ethical Concerns,
THE Los ANGELES TlMES, February 13, 1992, at 30. Further concerns about the sperm
bank industry were raised when the story broke about a doctor using his own sperm
to artificially inseminate wome~, leading to the birth of approximately 75 children.
See id.

63

See Eric Lichtblau, Artificial Insemination Data Raises Fears,
August 10, 1988, at 14.

THE

Los ANGE-

LES TlMES,

64 See People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968) (stating that a man separated
from his wife remains obligated to pay child support to wife for child conceived
through artificial insemination with husband's consent). See also Curiale v. Reagan,
222 Cal. App. 3d 1597 (1990), Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991),
and West v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 59 Cal. App. 4th 302 (1997) (stating that a woman once in a lesbian relationship where her partner conceived a child
through artificial insemination during the relationship, has no rights to an award of
custody or visitation to the child). See also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d
386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (stating that a man selected and used as a as a sperm
donor by two women who wish to raise a child together without the supervision or
assistance of a physician, is the legal and natural father of the child conceived
through this artificial insemination).
65

See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386.

66

See id.
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C. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THEIR ApPLICATION TO DONOR
ANONYMITY

The right to privacy is protected by both the California
and federal constitutions. 67 Although the term "privacy" is not
mentioned in the federal Constitution, several United States
Supreme Court decisions established that a "zone of privacy"
exists within the Bill of Rights extending to such areas as
procreation and contraception. 68 In addition to the protection
interpreted in the Bill of Rights, the right to privacy contained in the California Constitution extends to a person's
medical information as well as that person's right to be "left
alone."69
In California, the test for determining a violation of person's right to privacy was set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. 70 Under Hill, a violation will be
found if a legally-protected privacy interest is present,71 the
expectation of privacy is reasonable under the circumstances,72 and a serious invasion of privacy occurred. 73 The
right to privacy is balanced against any opposing interests,
such as a compelling interest of the State. 74 In Hill, the court
concluded that mandatory drug testing did not violate a person's constitutional right to privacy.75 The Johnson case deals
with the novel issue of whether a sperm donor has a right to
67 See CAL. CONST. ART. I. I. This amendment states, "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id.
68 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). The "zone of privacy" interpreted within the Bill of Rights stems
from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. Id. See also Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute banning the distribution of contraceptives by non-physicians violated the Constitution).
69 See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975) (holding that the right to privacy included in the California Constitution included the right to be left alone). See also
Heda v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 525 (1990) (holding that medical records
are protected by the Constitutional right to privacy).
70 See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994).
71 See Hill, 7 Cal. 4th 1 at 39-40.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 37-38.
75 See id.
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privacy concerning the release of infonnation about his identity and medical information. 76 This issue is complicated by
the fact that the information is requested out of medical
necessity. 77
III.

FACTUAL ANi::> PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1989, Ronald and Diane Johnson purchased sperm
from the Cryobank spenn bank in Los Angeles, California. 78
The spenn was that of Donor 276, who, Cryobank verbally assured the Johnsons, had undergone the proper genetic and
disease testing. 79 Cryobank represented that the sperm was
safe for use in artificial insemination. 80 Prior to insemination,
Cryobank required the Johnsons to sign a fonn agreement allowing Cryobank to destroy all of its records and infonnation
containing the identity of the spenn donor. 81 After the Johnsons signed the agreement, Diane was inseminated, became
pregnant, and subsequently gave birth to Brittany in 1989. 82
In 1995, at the age of six, Brittany was diagnosed with a
genetic kidney disease known as Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease (hereinafter "ADPKD").83 ADPKD is an
inherited disease that affects many of the body's systems. 54 It
is characterized by a renal cyst that enlarges, and ultimately
causes, in about half of those diagnosed, end-stage renal failure, usually occurring between the age of 50 and 60. 85 Other
problems such as cardiac abnormalities, cerebral aneurysm,
and increased occurrences of cysts on other organs are also
associated with this disease. 86 According to a declaration submitted by one of Brittany's doctors, Brittany had already deSee Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056.
See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id at 1057.
81 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Jovan Milutinovic, M.D. Professor of Medicine Website, Clinical Character·
istics of Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease (visited September 26, 2000)
<http://www.musc.edulnephrology/JMl.htm>.
85 See id.
86 See id.
76

77
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veloped cysts on her kidneys at the time of her diagnosis, indicating that she had a highly advanced form of ADPKD.87 As
neither Diane nor Ronald Johnson had a family history of
ADPKD, and the disease can only be transmitted genetically,
her physician quickly determined that the anonymous sperm
donor was the likely carrier.88
During Donor 276's screening process, Cryobank, through
at least two of its employees, knew of Donor 276's family history of kidney disease. 89 In 1986, during an interview with
two Cryobank physicians, Donor 276 revealed that his mother
and sister had both been diagnosed with kidney disease, making his sperm at risk for transmitting the genetic kidney disease. 90 Despite this knowledge, it was not until 1991 that Cryobank ceased to use Donor 276 as a sperm donor because of
his family history and the risk his sperm carried kidney disease. 91 By that time, Donor 276 had sold 320 sperm specimens
to Cryobank, earning $11,200 from his donations. 92 The number of women who were impregnated with the sperm of Donor
276 is unknown. 93 However, not until Donor 276 had been removed from the list of Cryobank's donors did Cryobank inform
Diane Johnson of the possibility that the sperm donor she
used carried a genetic disease. 94
Upon learning this information, the Johnsons sued Cryobank for fraud, breach of contract, and professional negligence. 95 The thrust of the Johnsons' claim was that Cryobank
failed to properly screen Donor 276 for genetic defects. 96 Additionally, the Johnsons argued that Cryobank misrepresented
the sperm to them as having been properly screened and free
of any genetic disorder. 97
During the pre-trial discovery phase, the Johnsons requested information from Cryobank that would have revealed
87
88

89
90

91
92

93
94

95
96
97

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056-1058.
id. at 1056-1057.
id.
id.
id. at 1057.
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058.
id. at 1069-1070.
id. at 1057.
id. at 1056.
id.
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056.
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the identity and medical history of Donor 276. 9S Cryobank refused to produce that information on the grounds that doing
so would infringe on Donor 276's right to privacy.99 Additionally, Cryobank alleged that such a disclosure would breach
the anonymity agreements between all of the parties. 1OO When
responses to discovery regarding Donor 276's identity and
medical history were not forthcoming, the Johnsons moved to
compel answers to those questions. IOI The Johnsons argued
that such information was necessary considering the seriousness of Brittany's condition.102 Furthermore, the medical information the sperm donor could provide was potentially determinative of Brittany's medical treatment.I03 In support of
their motion to compel, the Johnsons submitted declarations
from two doctors stating that information regarding Donor
276's identity was vital to determining Brittany's medical
treatment and predicting the future developments of her disease. I04 The trial court originally granted the Johnson's motion, but later denied the motion to compel. 105
Soon thereafter, the Johnsons located an individual, John
Doe, whom they believed to be Donor 276.106 Although he had
not admitted to being the donor, the Johnsons served John
Doe with deposition and trial subpoenas.1°7 Negotiations began between the Johnsons and John Doe regarding his testimony.IOS The parties stipulated that John Doe's identity would
not be revealed and his testimony would be limited, at deposition and at trial, to his association with Cryobank and his
See id at 1057.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 1058.
102 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 1058-1059.
105 See id. at 1059. After the trial court granted the Johnsons' motion, Cryobank
filed a petition for writ of mandate, which was denied by the California Court of Appeals. Cryobank then petitioned to the California Supreme Court, who granted review. The matter was then remanded back to the California Court of Appeals, and an
Order to Show Cause was issued. Shortly thereafter, the trial court denied the Johnsons' motion. See id.
106 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059.
107 See id.
108 See id.
98
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and his family's medical history.lo9 The Johnsons then asked
the trial court to approve this stipulation and enter a protective order.110 However, John Doe later decided that he did not
want his deposition taken because he wished to be left
alone.l11 Additionally, Cryobank objected to the stipulation,
claiming that John Doe had a right to privacy and was protected by a physician-patient privilege. 112 The trial court did
not approve the Johnsons' stipulation regarding John Doe's
testimony and agreed with Cryobank's objection. 113
The Johnsons served John Doe with a second deposition
subpoena based upon the prior subpoena served, using John
Doe's true name, as well as his address and telephone number.114 This subpoena required John Doe to appear at a deposition and produce documents pertaining to his medical history.115 John Doe did not appear at the scheduled deposition.116
The Johnsons then moved to compel John Doe's compliance
with the deposition subpoena.ll7 Meanwhile, Cryobank moved
to quash the same subpoena.118
The trial court denied the Johnsons' motion to compel
John Doe's deposition and production of documents. 119 The
court held that John Doe had a privacy interest in keeping
his identity and personal information confidential. l20 The
court also held that the information the Johnsons moved to
compel of John Doe would not provide anything substantial,
and thus did not outweigh John Doe's privacy interest. l2l
See id.
See id.
111 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 1059·1060. See also Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, Johnson v. The
Superior Court of California, et aI., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2000) (No. SC
043434) at pg. 5.
115 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059-1060.
116 See id. at.1060.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id. The Johnsons motion to compel the deposition of John Doe was denied
by the trial court, finding that John Doe had a privacy interest and his right to remain anonymous was not outweighed by a compelling state interest. $ee id.
120 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1060.
121 See id.
109

110
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The trial court granted Cryobank's motion to quash and
denied the Johnsons' motion to compel John Doe's compliance
with the deposition and production subpoena. 122 The Johnsons
then filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel their motion, and to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting
Cryobank's motion to quash the deposition subpoena. 123 The
California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, granted the Johnsons' petition for writ of mandate. 124 The Appellate Court held that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the Johnsons' motion to compel John
Doe's deposition. 125 The court ordered the trial court to vacate
its order denying the Johnsons' motion, as well as the order
granting Cryobank's motion to quash, instructing the trial
court to grant the Johnsons' motion to compel. 126 The California Supreme Court has denied review. 127
IV.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
the court held that John Doe's privacy interest in keeping his
identity and medical information confidential was outweighed
by a compelling state interest in protecting the health and
medical interests of children conceived through artificial insemination. 128 In reaching this conclusion, the court examined
the scope of discovery for civil cases,129 the physician-patient
privilege,130 third party beneficiary status,131 and the constitutional right to privacy.132
122

See id.

123 See Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, Johnson v. The Superior Court of California, et aI., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2000) (No. SC 043434) at 5.
124 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 106l.
125 See id. at 1072.
126 See id.
127 See Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et aI., 2000 Cal.
LEXIS 6741 (2000).
126 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1072.
129 See id. at 1062. See also infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text.
130 See id. at 1062-1063. See also infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
131 See id. at 1063-1064. See also infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.
132 See id. at 1068. See also infra notes 165-207 and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/4

14

Bauman: Sperm Donation

2001]

A.

SPERM DONATION

207

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SCOPE OF DISCOVERY

The court first considered the discretion of a trial court to
manage the discovery of its cases. 133 The standard of review
for discovery rulings is one of abuse of discretion. 134 Only
when "no legal justification" exists for a ruling, mayan appellate court set aside a trial court's ruling. 13S In Johnson, the
court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion
by denying the Johnsons' motion to compel the deposition and
production of documents of John Doe and granting Cryobank's
motion to quash. 136
According to California Code of Civil Procedure Section
2017,137 the scope of discovery in civil cases is very broad. 138
Anything may be subject to discovery, so long as it is relevant
to the subject matter of the pending action and is not privileged. 139 The scope of discovery may include the identities of
persons with knowledge of anything discoverable. 140 The trial
court limited discovery by denying the Johnsons' motion to
compel John Doe's deposition and production of documents. 141
The court found that John Doe's identity and medical history were discoverable because this information was substantially relevant to the negligence cause of action regarding
Cryobank's screening process. 142 Furthermore, the court concluded that Cryobank's alleged misrepresentation to the Johnsons of the quality of the sperm rendered John Doe's medical
history discoverable. 143 Cryobank argued that any information
pertaining to Donor 276's identity and medical history was
privileged based on a physician-patient relationship between
Cryobank and John Doe. 144 Cryobank also argued that John
See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062.
134 See id. at 1061 (citing Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355,
378, 380 (1961)).
185 See id. at 1062.
136 See id. at 1072.
137 See CAL. Cw. PRoc. CODE § 2017 (West 2000).
138 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 1061-1062.
142 See id. at 1062.
143 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062.
144 See id.
133
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Doe's deposition should have been precluded because of the
privacy agreements signed by the parties, and John Doe's constitutional right to privacy.145 However, the court did not
agree with any of Cryobank's arguments. 146
B.

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Although Cryobank asserted the physician-patient privilege on behalf of John Doe, the court noted that John Doe did
not have a physician-patient relationship with Cryobank.147 To
have such a relationship, John Doe would have had to consult
Cryobank for medical treatment or diagnosis.1 48 John Doe
never used Cryobank in this capacity, but rather went to Cryobank to sell his sperm.149 Thus, John Doe was not by definition a patient of Cryobank and would have been unable to assert the physician-patient privilege in any cause of action. 150
Even if a physician-patient relationship existed, only the
patient may assert such privilege. 151 In this case, John Doe
did not assert this privilege. 152 Rather, it was Cryobank that
did. 153 If, in fact, John Doe had been a patient, he would had
to have asserted the privilege, because the Johnsons requested his personal information. 154 The court held that Cryobank, therefore, lacked the right to assert this privilege on
John Doe's behalf. 155
145
146

See id. at 1064, 1067-1068.
See id.

147 See id. at 1062-1063. See also Kizer v. Sulnick, 202 Cal. App. 3d 431, 439
(1988) (stating that people taking part in a study to determine the cause of similar
medical ailments in a residential area were not considered "patients"). See also People v. Cabral, 12 Cal. App. 4th 820, 828 (1993) (explaining that to assert the physician-patient privilege, the medical treatment must be the dominant purpose of the
treatment).
.
146 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063. See also CAL. Evm. CODE § 991 (West
2000).
149 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063.
150 See id.
151
152
153

154
155

See
See
See
See
See

id. See also CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 993-994 (West 2000).
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063.
id.
id.
id.
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THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS

The court next examined the privacy agreements signed
by all the parties. 156 Under California Civil Code Section 1559,
a contract may benefit and be enforced by a third party.157
This third party need not be specifically named, but must belong to the class that is to benefit from the contract.15S
John Doe argued that the agreement the Johnsons signed
prior to receiving sperm from Cryobank, with the intent of
maintaining the sperm donor's anonymity, established him as
a third party beneficiary to the contract between the Johnsons
and Cryobank.1 59 The agreement was made to benefit him
and, he argued, prevented the Johnsons from discovering his
identity.1 60 The contract contained provisions whereby the
Johnsons promised to never inquire as to the identity of the
donor.1 61 The court agreed that the contract between the Johnsons and Cryobank was designed to protect the confidentiality
of all of the parties involved. 162 Therefore, John Doe was a
third party beneficiary of this contract.16S The court, however,
disagreed with John Doe's assertion that this contract prohibited disclosure of his identity under any circumstance. l64
D.

PuBLIC POLICY VS. DONOR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Although the court decided that John Doe was a third
party beneficiary to the Johnson-Cryobank contract, it found
that allowing his status to shield him from disclosing his
See id. at 1064.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 2000).
158 See Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Vars, Pave, McCord & Freedman, 65 Cal.
App. 4th 1469, 1485 (1998)(citing Marina Tenants Assn. V. Deauville Marina Development Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 122, 128 (1986)).
159 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1064.
160 See id. at 1064-1065. A third party beneficiary of a contract can consist of an
unnamed class and may be either intended or incidental, and that determination is
decided by the agreeing parties' intent. In the agreement in the present case, a clear
intent was expressed that the intent for confidentiality was for all parties to benefit,
making the anonymous donor an intended beneficiary. See id.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 1065.
163 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1065.
164 See id. at 1064.
156

157
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identity violated public policy.165 If an agreement or contract
contradicts public policy, the contract becomes invalid and unenforceable. 166 As a result, the contract between Cryobank and
the Johnsons was invalid. 167
According to Family Code Section 7613,168 the paperwork
regarding an artificial insemination generally remains confidential with the facility and doctor performing the procedure,
but may be subject to inspection upon a showing of "good
cause."169 Although case law does not set forth the "good
cause" requirement, the court yielded to the argument that
requiring identity disclosure for the purpose of getting potentially helpful medical information constituted a "good cause"
under the statute. 170 The contract between Cryobank and the
Johnsons contained no provisions allowing for disclosure of
the donor's identity, and included a provision allowing Cryobank to destroy all of the records, which would render disclosure impossible.l7l The contract was therefore contrary to
statutory authority and violated public policy under Section
7613.172 The court took special notice, however, that Cryobank
was aware of the Section 7613 "good cause" provision, including a clause in its privacy agreements with donors, including
John Doe, that explained the possibility of identity
disclosure. 173
Because the contract between the Johnsons and Cryobank
violated public policy, the court had to decide whether John
Doe's privacy interest in maintaining his anonymity required
protection from the Johnsons' demand for disclosure, despite
the invalidity of their contract with Cryobank.174 In order to
determine whether John Doe's "inalienable" right to privacy
166
166

See id. at 1065.
See Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1821, 1825-1826

(1993).

See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1067.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000).
169 See id.
170 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1066-1067. See also Ginsberg, supra note 30,
at 847-850. See also Swanson, supra note 7, at 183-184. See also Koehler, supra note
11, at 324-330.
171 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1064-1065.
172 See id. at 1066
173 See id. at 1066-1067.
174 See id. at 1068.
167

168
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would be violated, the court applied the Hill test. 175 The court
described the two classes of legally recognized privacy interests, one involving a person's information, and the other involving a person's autonomy.176 An informational privacy interest is an interest in protecting confidential information,
while· an autonomy interest is an interest in making individual, personal choices without outside interference. l77 The Hill
test applies to both classes of privacy interests. 17S Had John
Doe had any legally protected privacy interests, he would
have been protected from the Johnsons' discovery demands. 179
An individual's medical history is a legally-protected privacy interest. ISO Since John Doe's identity was linked to his
medical history, his identity was a privacy interest. lSI The
court also decided that the limited disclosure of artificial insemination documentation under Section 7613 gave sperm donors a limited privacy interest. IS2 However, the court determined that Section 7613 limited a sperm donor's legitimate
expectation of privacy by providing for the possibility of documentary disclosure of artificial insemination information. ls3
The disclosure of this information could reasonably include
the identities of the parties. l84 As a result, the level of privacy
that may be expected is diminished.185
The court acknowledged that Cryobank told its donors
that disclosure of any identifying documentation was highly
improbable, but disclosure of non-identifying information was.
possible.186 As a result, Cryobank's sperm donors may have
See id. (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 52-57).
See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1068 (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 35).
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069 (citing Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th
402, 440-441 (1996».
181 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See id. Disclosure of otherwise confidential information regarding an artificial
insemination procedure may occur upon court order with a showing of "good cause."
When the health and medical treatment of a child conceived through artificial insemination is at stake, "good cause" for disclosure is likely established. See id.
185 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069.
186 See id.
175

176
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reasonably expected their anonymity to remain intact. 187 However, their reasonable expectation of privacy concerning nonidentifying medical information was diminished. 188 Mter all,
Donor 276 submitted 320 sperm specimens to Cryobank over
the course of five years, which were used by an unknown
number of Cryobank clients, creating a commercial relationship between Donor 276 and Cryobank.189 These facts led the
court to conclude that Donor 276's relationship with Cryobank
possibly affected many people. 190 The court held that, based
on these circumstances, Donor 276 could not reasonably expect that his privacy would be maintained because his expectation of privacy had been diminished by his relationship with
Cryobank. 191
Although the court held that John Doe's privacy interest
in maintaining his anonymity was diminished by his fruitful
commercial relationship with Cryobank, John Doe argued that
to disclose the information would nevertheless constitute a serious invasion of privacy.192 As the information sought extended to the donor's family, the court agreed that the disclosure of medical history of John Doe's family created the
possibility of a serious invasion of privacy.193 In determining
whether to protect this information, the court weighed the impact of this invasion against the other interests involved. 194
In this case, because the disclosure had been court ordered, a state action was involved. 195 In order to override the
constitutional right to privacy, a court must find a compelling
state interest to do SO.196 The court held that the State had
several such interests. 197 First, the State has a compelling interest in maintaining compliance with discovery subpoenas. 198
Second, the State has a compelling interest in keeping court
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069-1070.
id. at 1070.
id. at 1070.
id.
id. at 1071.
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071.
id. at 1071.
id.
id.
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proceedings truthful. 199 Third, allowing those who are injured
complete redressability is a compelling interest. 2oo Although
the court considered these interests against John Doe's right
to privacy, the court focused on a fourth state interest in its
analysis. 201
In addition to the aforementioned state interests, the
court also determined that the State had a compelling interest in protecting the health and welfare of children conceived
through artificial insemination. 202 The court then acknowledged that occasionally it becomes necessary for individuals
that have used artificial insemination to obtain information
regarding the biological and genetic backgrounds of their children. 203 For some, this information can mean the difference
between life and death. 204 For this reason, the court determined that the parties must have avenues to uncover the otherwise confidential documentation regarding artificial insemination procedures. 205 As a result of the compelling state
interest in protecting the health and welfare of Brittany, as
well as that of all children conceived through anonymous donor artificial insemination, the court determined that the trial
court's denial of the Johnsons' motion to compel was an abuse
of discretion and vacated its order.206 Based on its findings,
the court ordered that the case be remanded to the trial
court, with directions to grant the Johnsons' motion to compel
and order the deposition and production of documents from
John Doe, limited to information necessary and relevant to
the litigation. 207
199

See id.

200

See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071.

201

See id.

202 See id. at 1071-1072 (citing Mansfield v. Hyde, 112 Cal. App. 2d 133, 139
(1952) (stating the State has a continuous interest in protecting the welfare of
children».
203

See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071.

204

See id.

205

See id.

206

See id. at 1072.

207

See id.
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V.

CRITIQUE

The Johnson court's decision will have major consequences on the anonymity aspects of the artificial insemination industry. Furthermore, this decision will serve as a reminder that in an era of technological advancements, a
priority must still be placed on the health and safety of children. While the secrecy surrounding the artificial insemination process can seem insurmountable to a parent or child in
need of an anonymous sperm donor's medical history, the
Johnson decision will ease the struggle of those in need of
this information by creating an avenue for access. 208
A.

THE COURT'S DECISION

The court in Johnson correctly decided that a parent's interests in obtaining private information about a sperm donor
are more compelling than the privacy rights of that donor. 209
Although the Johnson court decided a novel issue, the dilemma is not startling, considering the fact that more than
30,000 children are conceived through artificial insemination
each year.210 As this number of children continues to grow, the
potential for genetically-based medical problems similar to
those faced by Brittany also increases. 211
The court created precedent with this decision. Prior to
this decision, no California cases interpreted the "good cause"
requirement for the release of artificial insemination documents in California Family Code Section 7316. By decidirig
that Brittany's need for medical information regarding John
Doe constituted "good cause," the court set a standard for
plaintiffs' right to information regarding artificial
insemination.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the privacy
interests of the donor. Although it demanded that the trial
court compel John Doe's deposition and production of documents, the court also demanded that this disclosure be made
with the fullest possible protection of John Doe's identity, as
See Edelman, supra note 14, at AI.
See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1072.
210 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 826.
21l See Ted Appel, Woman Files Suit to Know Name of Sperm Donor, UNITED
PREss INTERNATIONAL. September 24, 1987, at DL
WS

209
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well as that of his family members.212 The court was careful in
trying to accommodate the interests of all parties by giving
the Johnsons the ability to obtain information regarding John
Doe, while not forcing him to completely give up his anonymity.213 However, this decision undermines the long-held position of the artificial insemination industry that information
about donors should never be available. 214 This result, although potentially harmful to the artificial insemination industry, was correct because the interests the parties involved
were properly balanced.

B.

RIGHTS TO ANONYMITY V. NECESSITY OF DISCLOSURE

In Johnson, both the Johnsons and Donor 276 signed
agreements that stated that the donor's identity would remain
anonymous. 215 Because of Cryobank's assurances, the Johnsons did not consider that the sperm they received could have
any defect.216 Cryobank's negligence caused the Johnsons to
conceive a child with a genetically transmitted disease. 217
Under general guidelines set for sperm donors, Cryobank, one
of the largest sperm banks in the country,218 should have detected Donor 276's genetic history and eliminated him as a
donor.219 When problems like this occur, the children born
through artificial insemination should not have to pay the
price when they require information about the donors used to
conceive them. The fact that artificial insemination requires
an anonymous third party to become part of the reproduction
process creates the potential for problems should the resulting
child develop medical problems.
Anonymity and secrecy are long-held requirements of the
See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1072.
213 See id.
214 See McNulty, supra note 4, at l.
215 See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1056-105S.
216 See id. at 1056.
217 See id.
218 See Squires, supra note 2S, at 9.
219 See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1056-1057. See also Autosomal Dominant
Polycystic Kidney Disease Knowledge Base (visited September 26, 2000) <http://
www.cimr.cam.ac.uklmedgen/pkdldefault.htm>. Approximately one in every SOO people is aft1icted with ADPK. See id. See also Milutinovic, supra note S4.
212
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artificial insemination process. 220 The necessity of this secrecy
is rarely questioned. 221 In a situation like that faced by the
Johnsons, the need for such a shroud of secrecy becomes
blurred because of the child's need for information regarding
her biological origins. 222 Under their agreement, the Johnsons
had the same right to maintain anonymity as Donor 276. 223
However, they revealed themselves to uncover information
they believed was necessary for their child's well being.224 Although an anonymous donor may expect the agreed to privacy
after donation, he should not expect that his anonymity will
be protected at all costs.
Few question the reasons why a donor would require such
anonymity protection. A donor has sold his sperm, and, therefore, his genetic make-up, in the likelihood that it will be
used to conceive children. 225 Mter screening, once a man is selected as a sperm donor, a sperm bank will contract with the
donor only if the donor agrees to make constant and continuous donations. Donor 276 had donated 320 sperm specimens
to Cryobank,226 which means that he could have fathered as
many children. After he was informed that he could no longer
be a donor because of his genetically-transmitted disease, Cryobank should have made him aware that children conceived
with his sperm could have been born with a disease he gave
them, and disclosure of information about him might be
necessary.
C. THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO KNow

Despite the sperm bank industry's concerns that the possibility of identity disclosure will lead to fewer donors, children born through artificial insemination must have access to
information about the donors used to conceive them. If a
child, like Brittany, is diagnosed with a genetic disease traceable only to the sperm that aided in her creation, that child
must have an avenue to uncover information that may deter220
221
222
223
224
225

226

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Edelman, supra note 14, at AI.
Swanson, supra note 8, at 154.
McNulty, supra note 4, at 1.
Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056.
id. at 1056-1057.
Swanson, supra note 8, at 151-152.
Johnson; 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058.
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mine a course of treatment and ultimately impact her health.
Children born through artificial insemination may suffer from
specific medical conditions, such as cancer, that are more curable through early detection. 227 Knowledge of a genetic predisposition to such a disease could make a huge difference in the
rate of the child's recovery.228 Even if only a small chance exists that this information could help the child, access to information should be available. 229
The tensions between donor and child expressed in Johnson are similar to those that arise in the area of closed adoptions. 23o In a closed adoption, records regarding the identities
of the parties are sealed, making access to necessary medical
information very difficult. 231 Groups battling between open
and closed adoptions have many of the same concerns that
plague those involved with artificial insemination, such as the
right to remain anonymous, and the medical necessity of releasing identifying information. 232 As a result of problems
caused by closed adoptions, some states require all adoption
records to be open. 233 Medical necessity of adoptees, an analogous problem to that faced by Brittany in Johnson, is an area
of concern that has contributed to the shift from closed to
open adoptions. 234 However, the main difference between the
anonymity requirements of artificial insemination and adoption, however, is the expressed sentiment of those favoring
open adoption that adopted children should be allowed to
know their biological heritage and that the denial of such information can be detrimental to these children. 235 This position is not highly promoted in the area of artificial insemination, but the decision in Johnson is a step towards
ameliorating this problem.
See Swanson, supra note 8, at 174.
See id.
229 See id. at 174-175.
230 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See David E. Rovella, Parental Right Not to be Found, THE NATIONAL LAw
JOURNAL, November 16, 1998, at A7. Four states currently have laws requiring all
adoption records be open; Alaska, Kansas, Tennessee and Oregon. See id.
234 See Deborah McAlister, Hidden Histories: Adoptees in Texas Can't Answer Key
genetic Questions, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, August 23, 1998, at 6J.
235 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. See also Rovella, supra note 232, at A7.
227
228
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The court points out that the privacy agreements signed
by the Johnsons violated public and statutory policy.236 The
statutory provision in Family Code Section 7613, which allows
for the inspection of artificial insemination records, prevents
poor record keeping of artificial insemination procedures. 237
Despite Section 7613, the general practice of most sperm
banks is to destroy all documentation so that identification of
a specific donor continues to be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 238 This practice violates the rights of children born
through artificial insemination by destroying identifying information that the children may have "good cause" to access.
However, as a result of the Johnson decision, these children,
and their parents, are now able to go to court to demand
identifying information about their donors.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The court in the Johnson case properly decided that the
state's interest in protecting the health of a child created by
artificial insemination is more compelling than maintaining
the privacy and anonymity of a sperm donor. Allowing for the
discovery of a donor who wished to stay anonymous does not
violate the privacy rights of that donor. This case will cause
sperm banks to more carefully screen potential donors and to
increasingly question the practice of strict anonymity in artificial insemination procedures, especially as society becomes
more aware of the importance of genetics in determining our
own individual health.

Jenna H. Bauman*
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See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1065.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Swanson, supra note 8, at

154.
See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. See also Rubin, supra note 11, at 1.
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